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COMPETITION, INTEGRATION AND 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN THE EEC 




One of the main purposes of the EEC Treaty is to stimulate competition 
between firms by opening up markets. That free movement of goods and 
increased competition are closely related objectives is apparent from Article 
3 of the Treaty, which states that the activities of the Community shall in-
clude, among others: 
a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of 
quantitative restrictions on the import and ·export of goods, and of all other 
measures having equivalent effect; 
c) the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of 
movement for persons, services and capital; [and] 
f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common 
Market is not distorted.1 
As early as 1956, experts appointed by the six original Member State 
governments to investigate measures to pursue integration after the failure 
of the European Defence Community clearly established this link between 
the abolition of barriers to trade and an increase in the intensity of competi-
tion. In what has come to be known as the "Spaak Report,"2 the experts 
noted the technology gap then separating Europe from the United States 
and proposed, as a remedial measure, the creation of a ''vast zone of com-
mon economic policy, constituting a powerful production unit, and al-
lowing a continued expansion, and increased stability, an accelerated 
raising of the standard of living and the development of harmonious rela-
tions between the States belonging to it."3 The authors of the Spaak Report 
envisioned an enlarged market in which firms would be able to grow to 
optimum size without acquiring a de facto monopoly: ''The strength of a 
vast market is to allow the combination of mass production with the ab-
* Professor of Law, Free University of Brussels. LLD. 1956, Free University of Brussels; 
LL.M. 1958, New York University. -Ed. 
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 3, 298 
U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. 
2. Report of the Heads of Delegations to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs presented to the 
Intergovernmental Committee established by the Messian Conference, Apr. 21, 1956 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Spaak Report]. 
3. Spaak Report, supra note 2, at pt. 1, Introduction. 
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sence of monopoly."4 Moreover, it was felt that this wider market would 
compel firms to do away with obsolete production methods and to increase 
the quantity and quality of their goods. Thus, free movement of goods was 
seen as a means of increasing competition, which itself was seen as a means 
of enhancing economic efficiency. 
The authors of the Spaak Report saw a need for rules on competition, as 
a necessary complement to rules guaranteeing free movement of goods. 
They stressed, among other considerations, the risk that private firms could 
reestablish barriers between Member States by market sharing agreements, 
dual-pricing practices, dumping and other discriminatory practices.5 
However, the authors were aware that "a Common Market is not in all 
cases the same thing as a completely free market."6 In two sectors, agricul-
ture and transport, it was realized that, in view of the extensive control 
exercised by States over market mechanisms, the mere abolition of barriers 
to trade would give rise to unequal conditions of competition. In order to 
avoid serious social problems, it was felt that State interventionism should 
not be abolished, but should instead be replaced by a Community interven-
tion system providing for equivalent guarantees. Therefore, in these two 
areas, the Treaty provides not only for free trade but also for the establish-
ment of common regulatory policies based on uniform or harmonized legis-
lative provisions. 
In other areas, with a few exceptions,7 the elimination of trade barriers 
is automatic; although approximation of legislation and coordination of 
economic policies are called for, they are not a necessary pre-condition for 
the realization of the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital 
across national borders. In these other areas, 8 the end of the transitional 
period (December 31, 1969) was the cut-off date by which all barriers, re-
strictions and discriminations in intra-Community relations had to be abol-
ished, whether or not measures had been taken by that time to equalize 
conditions of competition.9 
The practical difficulties which the opening up of State borders might 
cause were to be met by the adoption of safeguard measures, under Com-
munity supervision. Most of these measures, however, could be granted 
only during the transitional period.10 
II 
The transitional period expired more than fourteen years ago. Never-
theless, in many industries, economic conditions diverge widely among the 
4. Id 
5. Spaak Report, supra note 2, at pt. I, tit. III, ch. I, § I. 
6. Spaak Report, supra note 2, at pt. I, Introduction. 
1. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 57(3) ("In the case of the medical and allied 
pharmaceutical professions, the progressive abolition of restrictions shall be dependent upon 
coordination of the conditions for their exercise in the various Member States."), 
8. Except for capital movements: see EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 67; see also Public 
Prosecutor v. Casati (Case No. 203/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2595. 
9. See Reyners v. Belgian State (Case No. 2/74), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J, Rep. 631. 
10. See EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 226. 
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Member States. Different national policies concerning State aid, price con-
trol regulations, "buy national" purchasing policies, discriminatory tax re-
gimes, differences in purchasing power, exchange rate fluctuations, and 
incomplete harmonization of commercial policies vis-a-vis non-Member 
countries give rise to unequal conditions of competition. To ignore these 
differences and force private firms to treat the Member States as a single 
market imposes on such firms a rather severe burden. 
The Treaty provides a variety of remedies for these problems. If the 
distortion of competition arises from a Treaty violation by a Member State, 
articles 169-171 provide that the Commission and other Member States 
have the right to bring an action before the Court of Justice. However, this 
procedure is time consuming and individuals have no right to compel ac-
tion to be taken against a Member State.11 If the distortion is due to State 
aid, articles 92-94 furnish the Commission with far-reaching remedial pow-
ers, which the Commission has only recently begun to exercise to any con-
siderable extent. Here too, the process is time-consuming, and individuals 
probably lack the right to force the Commission to take action. Distortions 
resulting from other sources can only be eliminated by approximation of 
legislation under articles 99-102, a procedure even slower and more cum-
bersome than that under articles 169-171 and 92-94. Nor do individuals 
have any standing to demand that approximation activities be commenced. 
Finally, the Treaty provides in general terms in articles 103 to 109 for the 
coordination of Member States' economic policies. It is generally recog-
nized that progress in that area has lagged far behind the realization of free 
movement of goods, persons and services. 
III 
It is likely that the problems resulting from the lack of unified market 
conditions will persist for some time to come. What, in the meantime, 
should be the Community's reaction if firms opt for "self-help" in dealing 
with this problem of nonuniformity, attempting unilaterally to remedy what 
they often rightly perceive as severe handicaps? 
Until now, the orthodox view, exemplified by the practice of the Com-
mission and the case law of the Court of Justice, has been to ignore or 
minimize the gravity of the problem. Numerous decisions have condemned 
firms' attempts to protect themselves against the consequences of operating 
in a free but nonunified market. 
Thus, in Centrafarm B V v. Sterling Drug Inc. , 12 the court was asked 
whether a patent owner could prevent importation of products which had 
been sold by him or with his consent in another Member State where he 
owned a parallel patent, where price differences existed resulting from the 
exporting country's efforts to control the price of the products. The Court 
stated: 
It is part of the Community authorities' task to eliminate factors likely 
to distort competition between Member States, in particular by the harmo-
nization of national measures for the control of prices and by the prohibi-
11. See LUtticke v. Commission (Case No. 48/65), 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 19, 27. 
12. (Case No. 15/74), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147. 
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tion of aids which are incompatible with the Common Market, in addition 
to the exercise of their powers in the field of competition. 
The existence of factors such as these in a Member State, however, can-
not justify the maintenance or introduction by another Member State of 
measures which are incompatible with the rules concerning the free move-
ment of goods, in particular in the field of industrial and commercial 
property. 
The question referred should therefore be answered in the negative. 13 
In United Brands v. Commission, 14 United Brands was found to have 
abused its dominant position by charging its distributors prices which dif-
fered according to the Member State in which distributors were established. 
In addition to denying its dominant position, United Brands argued, among 
other things, that it had only been adjusting to different marketing condi-
tions in the various Member States and charging in each Member State the 
maximum price the market would bear. The Court answered: 
Although the responsibility for establishing the single banana market 
does not lie with the applicant, it can only endeavor to take "what the 
market can bear'' provided that it complies with the rules for the regulation 
and coordination of the market laid down by the Treaty. 15 
In BMW Belgium SA v. Commission, 16 the Belgian sales subsidiary of a 
German car manufacturer had been fined by the Commission for having 
prevented a number of its Belgian dealers from reexporting German-made 
cars to Germany. Although the Court noted that prices were appreciably 
lower in Belgium than in other Member States, at least in part because of 
the price-freezing measures imposed by the Belgian government, it upheld 
the Commission's decision, .finding that BMW Belgium had committed an 
intentional infringement of the competition rules. 
Finally, in J)istillers v. Commission, 11 the Commission condemned the 
dual pricing system which The Distillers Company Limited (DCL), an im-
portant producer of Scotch whisky, used in response to different marketing 
conditions in the United Kingdom and in the continental EEC countries. 
Distillers' claim that it was impossible to market the same brand of Scotch 
whisky successfully at the same price in the United Kingdom and in the rest 
of the EEC was rejected. 
IV 
How should one judge the "orthodox view"? Several responses can be 
given to this question. 
1. At first sight, it may seem unduly harsh to force firms to compete in 
a nonunified economic environment without the right to protect themselves 
from the resulting adverse consequences. It seems that the firms are correct 
13. 1974 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 1164-65. 
14. (Case No. 27/76), 1978 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 207. 
15. 1978 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 298. 
16. (Case Nos. 32/78, 36-82/78), 1979 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 2435. 
17. Commission Decision 78/163/EEC, The Distillers Company Limited, Conditions of 
Sale and Price Terms, Art. 85, 21 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 50) 16 (Feb. 22, 1978) (hereinafter 
cited as Commission Decision]. 
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to object, as did United Brands, that the responsibility for establishing a 
single market is not theirs. 
However, this answer is superficial. It is not the purpose of the Treaty to 
treat firms "nicely." Economic integration necessarily causes painful ad-
justments and requires sacrifices. Established producers will have to reor-
ganize themselves, or even shut down, if they cannot adapt to new market 
conditions. 
2. A more fundamental objection is apparent if one considers an im-
portant goal of the opening-up of national borders: the elimination of less 
efficient firms. In a situation of distorted competition, there is no guarantee 
that this will happen: the brunt of the adjustment process may very well be 
borne by efficient firms. The result may well be a decline in overall market 
efficiency. 
3. Even so, however, a proponent of the orthodox view might answer 
that such a sacrifice may be temporarily necessary to stimulate further inte-
gration. Indeed, the process of European unification may have to proceed 
for a time at a faster pace in some areas than in others, thereby creating 
temporary imbalances. If adversely affected firms were allowed to shelter 
themselves against these inequalities, part of the pressure towards further 
progress would be removed. For instance, in Belgium the authorities are 
becoming increasingly aware of the difficulty of enforcing price control 
measures which are out of line with price levels in other Member States. If 
the attempts of Sterling Drug and BMW Belgium to prevent parallel trade 
had been permitted on the ground that the price differences causing that 
trade were caused by nationally imposed controls, the pressure on the af-
fected governments to avoid price discrepancies would be decreased. 
Although the importance of this factor should not be overestimated, it 
remains true that the "harsh" consequences of the orthodox view often help 
further the integrative process. To put it differently, if the Commission con-
sidered the differences in the legislative and economic situations of the 
Member States as justification for private obstacles to trade, part of the 
pressure for further progress towards harmonization of market conditions 
would be eliminated. The notion of a "common" market may appear in 
some respects to be a legal fiction; however, as with many legal fictions, it 
can be a useful tool for developing the law. 
4. There are, however, limits to the validity of this reasoning. The 
willingness of private firms to accept the fiction of a "common" market as if 
it were reality is not limitless. When the Commission prohibited DCL's 
dual pricing system, DCL withdrew its leading brand, Johnnie Walker Red 
Label, from sale in the United Kingdom and priced three other brands (Vat 
69, Dewars and Black & White) out of the U.K. market. Instead of fl.owing 
freely into the Continent at the U.K. price, as the Commission had ex-
pected, DCL's main brands simply stopped being sold in the U.K. and 
prices on the Continent remained unchanged. The Commission's decision 
seemingly ignored the idea that firms cannot be forced to continue to sell in 
parts of the Common Market where they consider market conditions to be 
distorted to their detriment. Thus, by prohibiting firms from imposing re-
strictions on cross-border trade within the EEC, "orthodox" competition 
policy occasionally compels firms to abandon a market totally, where the 
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alternative involves the risk that their sales in that market will cause unde-
sirable exports to other Member States. Such a result seems to be neither 
economically nor politically justified. It is in direct contrast with the 
Treaty's goal that goods purchased within the Community be supplied 
without restriction to consumers throughout the Community. Arguably, 
when distortions in market conditions are so great that firms deem it prefer-
able to give up selling altogether in certain markets to protect their position 
in other markets, allowing some restrictions of trade may be a "second 
best" alternative to complete freedom of trade. 
The Commission may be coming to realize this. For example, it re-
cently published a notice under article 19 (3) ofregulation No. 17 indicating 
its intention to exempt for three years DCL's "Promotion Equalization 
Charge" system for Johnnie Walker Red Label. 18 The system constitutes 
an amended version, limited to one brand, of the dual pricing system which 
had been condemned by the Commission in December 1977.19 
Will the Court follow the same trend? It is too early to be able to an-
swer with certainty. However, recent signs are not encouraging. Thus, in 
Merck & Co. Inc. v. Stephar BV,20 the Court considered whether a patent 
owner in one Member State (The Netherlands) was entitled under Article 
36 to prevent the importation of a pharmaceutical product ("Moduretic") 
which had been marketed in another Member State (Italy) where no patent 
protection existed for the product. The Court answered negatively: 
It is for the proprietor of the patent to decide, in the light of all the 
circumstances, under what conditions he will market his product, including 
the possibility of marketing it in a Member State where the law does not 
provide patent protection for the product in question. If he decides to do 
so he must then accept the consequences of his choice as regards the free 
movement of the product within the Common Market, which is a funda-
mental principle forming part of the legal and economic circumstances 
which must be taken into account by the proprietor of the patent in deter-
mining the manner in which his exclusive right will be exercised.21 
The Membran v. GEMA case22 concerned the right of a copyright owner 
to prevent imports of copyrighted sound recordings from the United King-
dom (where a system of statutory license was in force) into Germany 
(where license agreements can be freely negotiated and royalties rates are 
accordingly higher). The Court stated: 
It should be further observed that in a common market distinguished 
by free movement of goods and freedom to provide services an author, 
acting directly or through his publisher, is free to choose the place, in any 
of the Member States, in which to put his work into circulation. He may 
make that choice according to his best interests, which involve not only the 
level of remuneration provided in the Member State in question but other 
18. Notice Pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No. 17 Concerning Notification 
No. IV /30.228 (The Distillers Company p.l.c.) 26 0. J. EuR. CoMM. (No. C 245) 3 (Sept. 14, 
1983). 
19. Commission Decision, supra note 17, at 16. 
20. (Case No. 187/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2063. 
21. 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2082. 
22. (Case Nos. 55-57/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 147. 
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factors such as, for example, the opportunities for distributing his work and 
the marketing facilities which are further enhanced by virtue of the free 
movement of goods within the Community. In those circumstances, a 
copyright management society may not be permitted to claim, on the im-
portation of sound recordings into another Member State, payment of ad-
ditional fees based on the difference in the rates of remuneration existing in 
the various Member States.23 
In effect, this means that where the owner of an industrial property right 
is not entitled to reap the full benefit of his right in one Member State, he 
risks losing his full reward in the other Member States as well unless he 
withdraws his goods from the market of the first State. 
One may wonder whether this result is consistent with the objectives of 
the Treaty. In the view of the Treaty's authors, the purpose of the free 
movement of goods is to promote free competition which, in tum, increases 
economic efficiency. The Court's interpretation of article 36 of the Treaty 
in the Merck and Membran cases seems to make the free movement of 
goods an objective in itself, rather than a means to attain economic effi-
ciency through increased competition. It may seriously be doubted whether 
economic efficiency is advanced if Italian consumers are no longer able to 
obtain Moduretic from Merck in Italy, but have to import it from another 
Member State. An interpretation of article 36 which would have allowed 
Merck to preserve its rights in those countries where it owned patents, while 
continuing to sell in Italy, would arguably have better served economic effi-
ciency, even if it would have involved allowing Merck to restrict imports 
from Italy to The Netherlands. It would also have been more in keeping 
with the purpose of article 36 - to allow restrictions of trade when these 
are 'Justified on grounds of protection of industrial property." Pending the 
unification of patent laws, a "second best" alternative would have been 
preferable to the Court's intransigent insistence on free movement of goods 
at all costs. 
In this context it is worth noting that, in the agricultural sector, the 
Court has held that charges on trade between Member States, such as mon-
etary compensatory amounts, could be justified by the need to avoid dis-
torting trade in these products. The Court apparently considered decisive 
the fact that the common organizations of the agricultural markets are 
based on common prices, whereas economic and monetary policies have 
not yet been harmonized and therefore lead to fluctuations in exchange 
rates. 
In the Balkan case24 the Court acknowledged that: 
Although the compensatory amounts do constitute a partitioning of the 
market, here they have a corrective influence on the variations in fluctuat-
ing exchange rates which, in a system of market organization for agricul-
tural products based on uniform prices, might cause disturbances in trade 
in these products. 
Diversion of trade caused solely by the monetary situation can be con-
sidered more damaging to the common interest, bearing in mind the aims 
23. 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 165. 
24. Balkan Import-Export GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof (Case No. 5/73), 1973 
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1091. 
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of the common agricultural policy, than the disadvantages of the measures 
in dispute. 
Consequently these compensatory amounts are conducive to the main-
tenance of a normal flow of trade under the exceptional circumstances cre-
ated temporarily by the monetary situation. 
They are also intended to prevent the disruption in the Member State 
concerned of the intervention system set up under Community 
Regulations. 
Furthermore, these are not levies introduced by some Member States 
unilaterally, but Community measures which, bearing in mind the excep-
tional circumstances of the time, are permissible within the framework of 
the common agricultural policy.25 
In theRacke judgment,26 rendered a few years later, the Court repeated: 
The monetary compensatory amounts are not levies introduced by 
some Member States unilaterally but Community measures adopted to 
deal with the difficulties resulting for the common agricultural policy from 
monetary instability; they are not therefore covered by the prohibitions on 
levying charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties.27 
Although these cases concerned agricultural goods, it is submitted that 
there is no fundamental reason not to apply similar reasoning to industrial 
goods. Provisions of the Treaty, such as articles 36 and 85,28 should not be 
applied so rigidly as to effectively compel private firms to withdraw their 
goods from certain national markets where the conditions of competition 
within the Common Market are so distorted by the disharmonization of 
national measures that they are unable to maintain an adequate level of 
profitability. 
25. 1973 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 1113. 
26. Finna A. Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, (Case No. 136/77) 1978 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 
1245. 
27. 1978 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rec. at 1245. See also, as to the legality of the "clawback" 
provision provided for under the co=on organization of the market in sheep meat, Kind KG 
v. European Econ. Co=. (Case No. 106/81), 1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rec. 2885. As to the 
legality of a compensatory tax on ethyl alcohol under Article 46 of the Treaty, see St. Nikolaus 
Brennerei und Likllrfabrik v. Hauptzollamt Krefeld, (Case No. 337/82) (not yet published). 
28. EEC Treaty, supra note I, arts. 36 & 85. 
